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Habitual party donors represent an important revenue source for American political parties 
(Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox 2003). What remains unclear is whether the party 
committees can also count on these donors to support the congressional candidates who represent 
the parties’ best chances for seat maximization. Utilizing structural equation modeling and 
contribution data from the 2006 to the 2012 election cycles, I find habitual party donors and 
certain new party donors respond to changes in party control of the House by providing more 
support to incumbents when their party is in the majority and more support to non-incumbents 
when their party is in the minority. Moreover, party donors are more likely to give to 
congressional candidates, especially those competing in priority races, than non-party donors. 
Party donors additionally are revealed to be an important funding source for congressional 
candidates.   
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Over the course of their modern history, American party organizations have sought to 
build long-term relationships with their habitual donors using a wide variety of fundraising 
programs and tactics (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2003; Herrnson, 2012). 
Each party has its own donor pool of regular contributors. In 2012, the Republican Party 
committees could claim 191,372 of these donors and Democratic Party committees could rely 
upon 118,041 of these donors as a fundraising base. Without a doubt, these donors are vital to the 
ongoing mission, financial solvency, and subsequent electoral influence of the parties’ national, 
senatorial, and congressional campaign committees. Despite the central role of parties in the 
distribution of resources in U.S. elections, very little research assesses the consistency with 
which this important set of party donors contributes to both the party committees and the party’s 
candidates in ways that best serve the party’s interests (La Raja, 2013). In short, the loyalty of 
party donors and the degree to which the extra-party contribution decisions of these donors align 
with party interests is not well understood (La Raja, 2013; Francia et. al., 2003).  
 This study examines the contribution decisions of first-time and habitual party donors to 
determine whether each set of donors is more or less likely to support the party’s efforts to gain 
and retain seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is 
used to analyze the giving patterns of these two sets of donors in each party between 2006 and 
2012. Two sets of midterm and presidential election years are compared 2006/2008 and 
2010/2012 because party control changed in the House during each set of these years. The 
Democrats gained a majority of seats in the 2006 election and held onto that majority until the 
2010 election when the Republicans were able to reclaim majority status. Comparisons of these 
time periods are used to determine whether contribution patterns change in ways that reflect 
changes in party control in the House. The primary goal is to determine whether party donors 
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provide more contributions to experienced non-incumbent candidates when their party is in the 
minority in the House and seeks to expand the number of seats it holds and whether contributions 
to vulnerable incumbents are more likely when the party holds the majority of seats in the House 
but seeks to protect those seats.  
 I find Democratic habitual donors engaged in seat maximizing giving in 2006, 2008, and 
2012 and Republican habitual donors did so in 2006, 2010 and 2012. First-time donors were 
more likely to target competitive races in their second election cycle of contributing to House 
races despite less consistent giving to targeted races in their first election cycle of giving. 
Additionally, in a comparison of both sets of party donors to non-party donors, I find party 
donors are more likely to make contributions to congressional candidates and their likelihood of 
giving to specific subgroups of targeted candidates is much higher than it is for non-party donors. 
Finally, an analysis of the impact of party donors’ targeted giving to House candidates enables 
me to demonstrate the importance of party donors for congressional campaign fundraising as 
well as party seat maximization goals.  
 
The relationship between parties and individual donors  
 Previous studies identify a number of donor attributes and behaviors, which could predict 
the commitment of individual donors to the party’s goals. Most importantly, individual donors 
are ideological partisans who hold policy opinions that are ideologically distinct from average 
Americans (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006; Bramlett, Gimpel, 
and Lee, 2011; Page, Bartels, and Seawright, 2013). This attribute ties many donors to one party 
or the other. In fact, the vast number of individual donors give money to one only party. Between 
2006 and 2012, 1,074,372 donors gave to either the Democratic or Republican Party committees 
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whereas 3,447 donors gave to both parties. Clearly this later set of donors is more the exception 
than the rule. In Franica et. al.’s (2005) survey of the congressional donor pool in the 1996 
election, ideologically-oriented donors fully make-up one third of the donor pool. Although their 
study reveals diverse motives drive donors, importantly, their results indicate the most 
ideological donors tend to contribute most frequently both within and across election cycles and 
they are more likely to contribute to interest groups as well as parties and candidates who support 
their ideological views (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005). The results of other studies showing 
ideological candidates enjoy greater fundraising success from individual donors (Gimpel, Lee, 
and Perason-Merkowitz, 2008; Johnson, 2010) and those suggesting candidates may position 
themselves to attract the donations of ideological donors (Ensley, 2009; Moon, 2004) provide 
further evidence of the ideological bent of the donor pool. Given the prevalence of ideological 
donors in the congressional donor pool and the overall tendency of donors to contribute to a 
single party, it is likely party donors will be attentive to party goals at least some of the time.  
 Parties cultivate their donor pools over time by developing donor lists, which are 
expanded and maintained through the use of direct mail, special events, and targeted fundraising 
membership programs (Grant and Rudolph, 2002; La Raja, 2008; Herrnson, 2012). Further 
additions are made to the lists by campaigns sharing their own donor lists with the party 
(Herrnson, 1998; Cain, 2012; Dominguez, 2005). Party donors are also cultivated indirectly by 
party fundraisers who are recruited for their connections to existing elite networks which they 
leverage to bundle contributions for both the party and its candidates (Grant and Rudolph, 2002; 
Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995; Birnbaum, 2000; Gimpel, Lee, Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008). 
There is also overlap between consulting firms under contract with the party committees and 
many House campaigns, which engage in fundraising for both sets of clients (Cain, 2012; 
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Herrnson, 1992). Cain (2012) demonstrates House campaigns that hire party-connected 
consultants raise a larger percentage of funds from outside of their districts. Cain (2012) argues 
this is due to the firms’ connections to the party’s network of national donors. In sum, party 
officials, party activists, and party-connected consultants all solicit funds from party donors on 
the behalf of candidate campaigns and the party. They lower information costs for donors by 
matching donors with like-minded candidates and by extensively tracking the competitiveness of 
congressional races in order to target resources toward the races which present the greatest 
opportunities for gaining seats and those where resources are needed to protect existing seats 
(Gimpel, Lee, Peason-Merkowitz, 2008; Herrnson, 2012). Thus, party donors are likely to be 
informed about the party’s goals and be able to contribute in ways that align with those goals if 
so desired. 
  Given the preponderance of donors contributing to a single party, evidence from studies 
suggesting party donors are ideological, and the sophistication with which previous studies 
demonstrate parties interface with donors to lower their information costs by apprising them of 
races that are party priorities, there is good reason to believe donors might be attentive to party 
seat-maximization goals when they choose to make contributions to congressional candidates. 
Previous studies suggest habitual party donors are much more likely to be seasoned party 
activists with multiple interest group affiliations and a higher propensity than occasional donors 
to volunteer on campaigns (Francia et. al., 2003, 2005). Their ties to the party are likely stronger 
than those of first-time donors. Giving patterns for both habitual and first-time contributors are 
hypothesized to reflect changes in party control in the House with the likelihood of party donors 
giving to experienced challengers and open-seat candidates rising when their party is in the 
minority and the likelihood of vulnerable incumbent support rising when their party is in the 
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majority. The magnitude of the party control effect should be higher for habitual contributors 
than first-time contributors.  
 
Data and methods 
 Using structural equation modeling  (SEM), I test the extent to which party donors 
provide funds to targeted races that could help their party gain more seats or to protect their seat 
margins in the House as opposed to contributing funds to interest groups which may or may not 
serve party interests. SEM is used to examine the impact of exogenous variables on endogenous 
variables and the effect of different endogenous variables on one another using path analysis. In 
this instance, SEM models the relationships among individuals’ contributions to parties, 
candidates, and interest groups as “a whole process of a series of nested dependent variables, 
modeling direct and indirect effects, with multiple dependent variables”  (Price and Collet, 2012: 
13; Bollen, 1989). This feature makes it possible to control for prior giving while factoring 
multicollinear effects between endogenous variables and error variances into the model. The 
ability to interpret these endogenous effects counts as an advantage here because the goal is to 
determine whether party donors are directing funds to promising non-incumbents and to protect 
incumbents. Since by law donors can only contribute up to the global maximums during the time 
period of this study (discussed below), their contribution decisions are partly dependent upon 
how many candidates fall into each of these two categories and how attractive those candidates 
are relative to one another—as a consequence, the error variances are correlated in the models. 
Paths are also included to represent the effect each type of giving has on other types of giving. In 
SEM, the goal is for the researcher to find the best model to fit the data—in this regard it is a 
confirmatory rather than exploratory approach (Golob 2003). I use Stata’s program for structural 
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equation models using the maximum likelihood method of estimation for all of the models that 
appear below. Robust standard errors are utilized to account for some heteroskedasticity in the 
error variances. 
All contribution data are gleaned from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 
Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2013). The portion of the dataset used in this study includes all 
individual contributions that were reported to the U.S. Federal Election Commission between 
2004 and 2012. The dataset represents a major improvement upon using the FEC’s data directly 
because the “names, addresses, and occupation and employer titles [of the individual donors] 
have been cleaned and standardized” and “entity resolution techniques were used to assign 
unique identifiers” to all donors in the database (Bonica, 2013). The cleaned dataset makes it 
possible to reliably calculate the total contributions made by each individual donor in the dataset 
to the various party committees, different candidate campaigns, and to interest groups.  
Individual donors are divided into Democratic and Republican camps on the basis of 
whether the donor made a direct contribution to at least one of the parties’ national committees 
(presidential, senatorial, or congressional) between 2004 and 2012. The 3,447 donors who made 
contributions to both parties between 2004 and 2012 are not included in the party donor analysis. 
The total amounts each donor contributed to the party committees (Pty), interest groups (IG), 
vulnerable incumbents (Vulnerable), and experienced challengers and open-seat contestants 
(Experienced) are included as the other variables in the model. Reported hard dollar 
contributions are $200 and greater. Individual donors are limited by campaign finance law in 
terms of not only how much money they can contribute directly to candidates, parties, and 
interest groups as individual entities1 but also by how much they can give in total over the course 
of the election cycle to all three of these entities. The global contribution limit in 2006, the lower 
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bound of this dataset, was $95,000, and the cap for 2012, the upper bound of this dataset, was 
$117,000 per two-year cycle.2 The total contributions made to the party by first-time party 
donors and habitual party donors are tabulated separately for each election cycle. A donor is 
classified as habitual after making at least one contribution to at least one of the party 
committees in at least two different election cycles between 2004 and 2012. The 2004 data are 
utilized to identify habitual donors in 2006 but are not part of the SEM analysis.  
Interest group contribution totals include all direct contributions reported to the U.S. 
Federal Election Commission. This means only contributions to non-connected and connected 
political action committees (PACs) and reporting Super PACs are included in the analysis. 
Contributions to 501c interest groups are not included because those contributions are reported to 
the Internal Revenue Service rather than the FEC and are not typically itemized. I categorized 
non-incumbents as experienced prior to generating total amounts given by each individual party 
donor to these candidates using a dummy indicating whether the non-incumbent candidate has 
previously held elected office or not. I also categorized incumbents as vulnerable or not based 
upon Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) classification of House races in October of each election 
year prior to calculating the total contributions to vulnerable incumbents made by each 
individual party donor.  
 These variables make-up the models displayed in Figures 1-10 in the online Appendix 
and the corresponding tables highlighting specific effects within time periods and specific 
pathways from those models (see Tables 1-4). Since a primary goal of SEM analyses is to find 
the best fitting model, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual term is used to asses fit. The 
SRMR is “standardized difference between the observed correlation and the predicted 
correlation” (Kenny, 2016). The benchmark for the SRMR is 0.08 (Hu and Bentler, 1998). 
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Scores of less than 0.08 are considered a good fit and an as the score approaches zero the 
predictive fit of the model to the data nears a perfect fit. I also include the coefficient of 
determination to provide a sense of the model’s overall coverage of variance.  
 
Contribution patterns by party and period 
 The results of the SEM analysis are displayed in Figures 1-10 in the on-line Appendix. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the goodness of fit statistics for each model, the direct effects of party 
contributions on contributions to specific House races and interest groups, and the total effects of 
giving in the previous election cycle on all forms of giving in the following election cycle. The 
SRMR of the 2006-2008 models is 0.022 for both sets of Republican donors and 0.041 for both 
sets of Democratic donors. In the 2010-2012 models it is 0.27 for Democratic first -time donors 
and 0.054 for Democratic habitual donors and 0.024 for Republican first-time donors and 0.012 
for Republican habitual donors. All of the SRMR values are well below the 0.08 benchmark. 
This suggests the fit of all eight models in Tables 1 and 2 is excellent. A glance at Figures 1-10 
reveals the same model was utilized for all subsets of the data.  
 As hypothesized, the period effects reflect donors’ responsiveness to party control of the 
House. At the outset of the 2006 midterm election, Republicans held control of a majority of 
seats in the House. In this election cycle both first-time and habitual Democratic donors were 
more likely to contribute to experienced non-incumbents (!= 0.037 for first-time donors and != 
0.065 for habitual donors, see Table 1). By the 2008 election, the Democrats held a majority of 
seats in the House. In this election cycle, the likelihood of support slightly declined for 
experienced non-incumbents and increased for vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.012 for first-time 
donors and != 0.01 for habitual donors, see Table 1). Although first-time donors appear to 
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exhibit the same degree of support for vulnerable incumbents as experienced non-incumbents 
(!= 0.012 in Table 1), the significance of the pathway between party support and support of 
vulnerable incumbents in 2008 is higher, suggesting they gave more consistently to vulnerable 
incumbents than experienced non-incumbents. Mirroring these trends, both sets of Republican 
donors were more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents in 2006 election when their party 
was at risk of losing its majority in the House (!= 0.065 for first-time donors and != 0.076 for 
habitual donors, see Table 1). However, in 2008, neither first-time Republican donors nor 
habitual donors gave in ways that strategically supported the minority party’s goals to expand 
seat margins after losing control of the House in 2006. Habitual Republican donors are almost 
equally likely to give to experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.009) as vulnerable 
incumbents in 2008 (!= 0.015). Similarly, first-time Republican donors in 2008 also commit 
comparable levels of support to both targeted non-incumbents (!= 0.007) as vulnerable 
incumbents (!= 0.013). 
 The predicted giving patterns in 2010 and 2012 election cycles also reflect degrees of 
responsiveness to changes in party control. The Democrats maintained a majority in the House in 
the 2008 presidential election but lost control of a majority of seats in the 2010 midterm election. 
Conversely Republicans were on the offensive in the 2010 election hoping to expand their seat 
margins. In keeping with this goal, habitual Republican donors are more likely to provide 
support to experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.087 in Table 2) than vulnerable 
incumbents in 2010 (!= 0.006). However, both sets of Democratic donors appear unresponsive 
to seat margins of control in 2010. In fact, first-time donors in both parties have negative 
coefficients for the direct effects of party giving on candidate support in 2010 indicating their 
party contributions decreased their likelihood of giving to congressional candidates. In 2012, 
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however, more consistent giving patterns emerge. Habitual Republican donors are more likely to 
contribute to vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.088) than experienced non-incumbents (!= 0.010) 
when their party holds a majority in the House. First-time Republican donors’ giving patterns in 
this instance mirror those of Republican habitual donors with greater support given to vulnerable 
incumbents in 2012 (!= 0.107). Habitual Democratic donors are more likely to contribute to 
experienced non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.020) than vulnerable incumbents (!= 0.013) at a 
time when their party sought to expand seat margins. However, first-time Democratic donors do 
not exhibit similar support for party goals in 2012 (see insignificant direct effects in Table 2).  
 The direct effects above document patterns of giving within particular election cycles. 
The total effects are now discussed to highlight giving patterns across election cycles that can 
reveal important trends in the giving patterns of first-time donors. The degree to which first-time 
donors become more likely to target their contributions to competitive races is reflected in the 
total effects between the decision to contribute money to the party for the first-time and giving to 
targeted races in the next election cycle (see total effects rows in Tables 1 and 2). Democratic 
first-time donors in 2006 are slightly more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents than 
experienced non-incumbents in 2008 when the party was protecting its seat margins in the House 
(!= 0.026 versus	!= 0.024; see total effects in Table 1). Republican first-time donors from the 
2006 election cycle are slightly more likely to contribute to vulnerable incumbents in 2008 as 
well even though their party needed to expand its seats to regain the majority (!= 0.012 
versus	!= 0.015; see Table 1). In the 2010-2012 election cycle, the total effects of giving in 2010 
on giving to targeted races in 2012 show Democratic first-time donors in 2010 who became 
habitual contributors in 2012 align their giving with party goals. They are more likely to 
contribute to experienced non-incumbents in 2012 (!= 0.014 versus	!= 0.006; see Table 2). 
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While their support of non-incumbent candidates (!= 0.014 in Table 2) was not equal in 
magnitude to Democratic habitual donors (!= 0.031; see total effects in Table 2), their likelihood 
of supporting priority races rose from insignificance to half the magnitude of the coefficient for 
habitual donors (see Table 2). Similarly, the total effects of giving for first-time Republican 
donors show in their second cycle of giving in 2012 they targeted their funds to vulnerable 
Republican incumbents when their party held the majority (!= 0.037 in Table 2). Moreover, the 
total effects of giving money to the party for the first-time in 2010 are slightly higher in 
magnitude than the total effects uncovered for habitual Republican donors (! = 0.034 for giving 
to vulnerable incumbents in 2012 in Table 2).  
 A final period-based effect that was not anticipated is the decline in both first-time and 
habitual party donors’ likelihood of contributing to interest groups. The magnitude and in some 
instances the significance of both the direct and total effects decrease for both first-time and 
habitual Democratic and Republican donors between the 2006-2008 (see Table 1). The decline in 
party donor’s interest group contributions between 2006 and 2008 is small in magnitude but 
appears for all sets of donors. It may reflect the decline in giving to all groups that occurred as a 
consequence of the 2008 economic downturn. In the 2010, there is a dramatic increase in the 
direct effects contributions to the party have on the likelihood of contributing to interest groups 
that is quickly followed by a dramatic decease in 2012 (see direct effects Table 2). The dramatic 
increase in interest group giving in 2010 and similarly dramatic decrease observed in 2012 are 
likely a consequence of changes in campaign finance laws and relatedly, that the interest group 
totals included in these models are only for contributions that were reported to the U.S. Federal 
Election Commission. The implications of this finding are discussed in more detail below.  
Magnitude of effects: Comparison to non-party donors   
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 To gain a better sense of how consistently party donors contribute to the parties’ targeted 
set of races, I compare the results discussed above to a second analysis featuring non-party 
donors. The same time periods and the same models of the relationships between variables are 
utilized. The analysis includes all non-party donors who contributed to reporting interest groups. 
The goal is to determine whether contributing to interest groups makes it more likely for donors 
to give to targeted House races than contributing to political parties does. The results are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. The SRMR scores are 0.033 in 2006/2008 and 0.047 in 2010/2012. 
Both are well below 0.08 indicating the models fit the data very well.  
 The direct effects suggest giving to an interest group in 2006 does increase the donor’s 
likelihood of giving to either experienced non-incumbents or vulnerable incumbents in 2006. 
However, the magnitude of the effect (!= 0.013 for experienced non-incumbents and != 0.011 
for vulnerable incumbents in Table 3) is smaller than the direct effects for each set of party 
donors. In other words, party donors are more likely than non-party donors to give to targeted 
races in 2006. In 2008, the differences are even more pronounced. Giving to interest groups does 
not significantly influence giving to either set of candidates. In 2010, contributing to an interest 
group does significantly increase the likelihood that the donor will give to an experienced non-
incumbent (!= 0.006 in Table 4) but the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than the direct 
effect of party giving among habitual Republican donors (see Table 2, != 0.087). Interest group 
giving does not significantly predict giving to vulnerable incumbents in 2010. In 2012 interest 
group contributions actually decrease the likelihood of giving to vulnerable incumbents and does 
not significantly affect giving to experienced non-incumbents. In contrast, distinct giving 
patterns are observed for party donors highlighting their responsiveness to party goals in both 
election cycles (see Table 2). In short, party donors are more likely to give to congressional 
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candidates in general than non-party donors and their giving patterns reflect support for the 
parties’ electoral goals because the significance and magnitude of the coefficients on average 
reflect changes in party control of the House from one election to the next.  
 
Party donors’ responsiveness  
 Habitual party donors who chose to make contributions to House candidates between 
2006 and 2012 gave in ways that support their parties’ seat maximization goals. These patterns 
of giving were most pronounced in the 2006 and 2012 election cycles when habitual donors in 
both parties directed support to targeted races. In 2006, Democratic habitual donors directed 
funds to the parties’ experienced non-incumbent candidates reflecting the party’s need to expand 
its seat margins to gain control of the House (see Table 1). Conversely, Republican habitual 
donors channeled funds to protect vulnerable incumbents from defeat (see Table 1). In 2012, 
when the tables had turned and the Republican held a majority in the House, Democratic habitual 
donors once again gave in ways that would expand their party’s seat margins whereas 
Republican habitual donors contributed to vulnerable incumbents.  
First-time donors in both parties did not exhibit the same consistency in their giving 
patterns as habitual donors. The magnitude of the coefficients for all candidate-related giving are 
almost always larger for habitual donors than their first-time counterparts. Additionally, the 2010 
and 2012 election cycles included negative or insignificant direct effects for party giving on 
candidate giving for each set of first-time donors. Not only are they less likely to support their 
party’s preferred set of races but also they are less likely to contribute to congressional 
candidates in general. The summary statistics in Table 5 show the number of first-time donors in 
each party who contributed to candidates competing in targeted congressional races in each 
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election cycle. At most the number of first-time donors who contribute to targeted candidates 
only once rises to half the number of habitual donors who contribute to congressional candidates 
(see Table 5). Generally, the ratio of first-time donors to habitual donors giving to congressional 
candidates is much smaller. That said, today’s first-time donors can become tomorrow’s habitual 
donors. By their second cycle of giving, there were observable improvements in first-time 
Democratic donors’ likelihood of supporting party priority races in 2008 and 2012 and first-time 
Republican donors’ likelihood of targeted support in the 2012 election cycle (see total effects 
Tables 1 and 2).  
Even though important differences are revealed in the consistency of each set of party’s 
donors giving patterns, both sets of donors in each party are far more likely than non-party 
donors to make contributions to congressional candidates. Party donors’ likelihood of supporting 
particular subgroups of candidates, either vulnerable incumbents or experienced non-incumbents, 
greatly exceeded the likelihood of supporting those candidates by non-party donors. In fact, 
pathways for non-party donors’ likelihood of contributing to congressional candidates are only 
highly significant and positively signed in 2006, are insignificant in 2008, are barely significant 
only for experienced non-incumbents in 2010, and become negative or conversely insignificant 
in 2012 (see Tables 3 and 4).  
 While habitual party donors and new party donors who give a second time exhibit 
distinctive giving patterns reflecting party seat maximization goals, the descriptive statistics in 
Table 5 also show that only a portion of the parties’ donor pools choose to make contributions to 
House candidates. The last row for each party in Table 5 lists the number of party donors who 
gave to at least one of the party committees but chose not to give to any House candidates in 
each corresponding election cycle. The total number of donors in each party who confined their 
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giving to one or more of the party committees and did not contribute to any House candidates 
between 2006 and 2012 is 241,529 in the Democratic donor pool and 598,432 in the Republican 
donor pool. Part of the reason the number of donors who chose not to give money to any House 
candidates is higher for the Republicans is that in 2008, 365,425 contributors made one-time 
contributions to at least one of the Republican party committees—among these one time 
contributors, 349,983 did not make contributions to any House candidates. Although these 
numbers appear to undermine the results presented previously by revealing that the prevailing 
tendency of party donors is not to give to House candidates, the impact of the party donors who 
do give to House candidates merits further attention before any conclusions can be drawn about 
their importance.  
 Table 6 shows the number of House candidates who received any degree of financial 
support from party donors in each election cycle. Between 2006 and 2012, more than a two 
thousand House candidates from both parties, and roughly a 1,000 or more in each party, 
received support in each election cycle. Clearly, many congressional candidates benefit from the 
higher propensity of certain party donors to contribute to their campaigns. The next column in 
Table 6 shows the average amount of total support received by individual House candidates from 
all respective party donors. The average amount of total support collectively given by 
Republican party donors to particular candidates competing in House races varies from a little as 
$98,498 in 2008 to as much as $141,740 in 2012 and for Democratic donors it varies from 
$103,238 in 2006 to a high of $137,090 in 2012 (see Table 6).  
For targeted races, the average total amounts of support tend to be much higher. 
Experienced challengers total average campaign fundraising receipts ranged between $803,136 
in 2006 and $1.1 million in 2012. For this set of candidates, contributions from party donors can 
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represent over 15 percent or more of total fundraising receipts on average. For example, in 2010 
when Republicans were trying to expand their seat margins in the House, the average in the total 
support provided by Republican Party donors rose to $197,407 with a median of $41,800 for 
experienced challengers (see Table 6). That year experienced challengers in both parties were 
able to raise an average of $1,157,773 from all fundraising sources. Thus, support from party 
donors for an average challenger in this subset of candidates constituted over 17 percent of all 
receipts. In 2012, Democratic experienced challengers received an average total of $208,633 
(Table 6) with a median of $16,100 collectively from Democratic Party donors. The average 
amount of money raised by experienced challengers in 2012 was $1,106,300. The proportion of 
fundraising from Democratic Party donors amounted to 19 percent of all receipts for experienced 
challengers.   
For vulnerable incumbents and experienced open-seat candidates, party donors also 
represent an important revenue source. Vulnerable incumbents’ average total receipts range from 
$2.7 million in 2006 to $2.4 million in 2012 and experienced open seat contestants’ total receipt 
averages range from $1.4 million in 2006 to $1.3 million in 2012. For vulnerable incumbents, 
total contributions from party donors amount to 13 percent or more of all receipts on average. In 
2010, while the Republicans were busy trying to expand their seat margins, Democrats moved to 
protect their incumbents. In that election cycle, the average total support Democratic Party 
donors extended to individual vulnerable incumbents was $535,245 with a median of $339,393 
(see Table 6). Vulnerable incumbents raised an average of $2,510,894 in 2010 (with a median of 
$ 2,440,685). Thus, Democratic Party donors’ support constituted more than twenty percent of 
all fundraising receipts for an average vulnerable incumbent in 2010. This was the highest 
proportion of average total receipts made up by party donors of either party in any of the four 
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election cycles. For experienced open seat candidates support from party donors ranges between 
11 percent and 21 percent of total average fundraising receipts. In 2008, when Democrats sought 
to hold onto their majority, Democratic donors gave the most contributions to vulnerable 
incumbents but also to experienced open seat candidates (see Table 6). On average contributions 
from Democratic Party donors totaled $365,926 per experienced Democratic open seat candidate 
(see Table 6) amounting to 21 percent of all receipts for the average experienced open seat 
candidate. Since open seat races are the most competitive and as a consequence gain the most 
funding from all sources, the fact that party donors collectively can provide an average of 15 
percent of the funds raised by these candidates is all the more impressive. The analysis of the 
descriptive statistics and count data in Tables 5 and 6 show that party donors play a major role in 
congressional campaign fundraising and relatedly the likelihood the party will gain and retain 
seats of strategic importance.  
Candidates also may be able to count on greater support from party donors in the future. 
The number of Democratic donors who contribute to congressional candidates is increasing 
overtime among all subsets of donors (see Table 5). The number of Democratic habitual donors 
who also contributed to House candidates competing in races across the country rose from 
25,660 in 2006 to 40,327 in 2012 and the number of first-time Democratic donors who did the 
same rose from 8,019 in 2006 to 15,375 in 2012 (see Table 5). Whereas the number of 
Republican Party donors who contribute to congressional candidates rises in the presidential 
election cycles of 2008 and 2012 and recedes in the midterm election cycles of 2006 and 2010, 
the number of habitual donors providing support to House candidates increased from 22,851 to 
over 30,000 in 2010 and 2012 (see Table 5). Additionally, the number of House candidates 
receiving support from Republican Party donors is rising (see Table 6). In sum, the trends 
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uncovered in the descriptive data as well as the SEM analysis suggest that party donors are more 
likely to provide support to House candidates overtime. Part of the reason for this trend might be 
that the donors contributing to House candidates are not the parties’ highest dollar contributors. 
The average amount in total funds a Democratic Party donor, who was also supporting one or 
more House candidates, contributed to one or more of the Democratic Party committees was 
$4,630 in 2006, $8,467 in 2008, $3,458 in 2010, and $1,301 in 2012. For Republicans donors, 
the total contributions to one or more of the party committees averaged $4,274 in 2006, $4,856 
in 2008, $3,399 in 2010, and $2,378 in 2012 for the donors who were also making contributions 
to House candidates. Thus, while the party donors who extend support to House candidates are 
not typically small dollar donors, they are also not necessarily high rollers either given that the 
maximum a donor could give to a single party committee ranged from $26,700 in 2006 to 
$30,800 in 2012.  
 Support from party donors may become even more important in future election cycles 
due to growing competition from interest groups that can easily outraise and outspend 
congressional campaigns and parties. In 2010, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United 
(558 U.S. 310, 2010) made Super PACs and 501c organizations legal options for donors who 
wished to make unlimited contributions (Smith and Powell, 2013).  Contributions from 501c 
groups are not reported to the Federal Election Commission and individual donors’ names are 
not provided on reports to the Internal Revenue Service. And Super PACs have found ways to 
circumvent reporting requirements (Public Citizen, 2013; Marziani, 2012). As a consequence, 
these contributions are not part of the totals used in this analysis. However, they could account 
for the dramatic decrease in the direct effects for party giving on the likelihood of interest group 
giving between the 2010 and 2012 election cycles (see Table 2). New applications for status as 
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501(c) social welfare organizations rose from 1,751 in 2009 to 3,357 in 2012 (Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration, 2013). Similarly, applications for 501(c)5 labor and agricultural 
organizations rose from 543 to 1,081 and for 501(c)6 professional associations from 1,828 to 
2,338 (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, 2013). Additionally, U.S. Federal 
Election Commission reports indicate that the number of registered Super PACs grew from 83 in 
2010 to 1,262 in 2012.  
While it is not clear whether donors chose to give to Super PACs and 501cs instead of 
parties or candidates, it is one plausible explanation since donors have been quick to take 
advantage of these options. Between 2008 and 2010, anonymous donations more than doubled 
(Maguire, 2012) and they increased tenfold between 2010 and 2014 (Kroll, 2014). Thus, there is 
reason to believe these groups may constitute a new source of fundraising competition for both 
the parties and for candidate campaigns. Fortunately, another recent change in campaign finance 
law may help the party committees raise more money for their own coffers as well as those of 
candidates. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 
12-536, 2012, 2) the Court overturned the global cap representing the total legal amount an 
individual donor can contribute in hard money to federal candidates, PACs, and parties in a 
single election cycle (the cap was $123,200 in 2012). This means from a single contributor the 
parties can solicit the maximum contribution allowable (see Data and Method Section) to each of 
the three national party committees and then request additional funds at the legal limits for each 
of its 50 state parties, and all of its congressional candidates at the legal limit of $2,500 per 
candidate per election (Cillizza, 2014). Given rising competition from a wide variety of interest 
groups and the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, the parties may find it profitable to focus their 
efforts on the retention of habitual donors. The results of this study suggest these donors already 
	 21	
give in ways that support party seat maximization goals and have done so over an extended 
period of time. Their loyalty is an asset to the parties that should not be squandered.  
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Notes 
1. In 2006, an individual donor could give a maximum of $2,000 to each candidate per election 
and $25,000 to a national party committee per year (U.S. FEC 2006). In 2012, an individual 
donor could give a maximum of $2,500 to each candidate per election and $30,800 to a 
national party committee per calendar year (U.S. FEC 2012).  
2. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) overturned the global contribution caps for individuals. 
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Table 1: Predicting Party Donors' Contributions to House Candidates and 
Interest Groups 2006-2008  
 
FIRST-TIME 
DONORS 
HABITUAL 
DONORS 
Goodness of Fit  DEM GOP  DEM GOP  
SRMR 0.041 0.022 0.041 0.022 
Coefficient of Determination  0.371 0.219 0.578 0.421 
Direct Effects         
Pty06-->Experienced06 0.037*** 0.006*** 0.065*** 0.014*** 
Pty06-->Vulnerable06 0.017*** 0.065*** 0.018*** 0.076*** 
Pty08-->Experienced08 0.012** 0.007** -0.008 0.009*** 
Pty08-->Vulnerable08 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.01*** 0.015* 
Pty06-->Interest Groups06 0.145*** 0.081*** 0.229*** 0.292* 
Pty08-->Interest Groups08 0.130*** 0.075 0.162*** 0.163*** 
Total Effects         
Pty06--> Experienced08 0.024*** 0.012** 0.138 0.018*** 
Pty06-->Vulnerable08 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.035*** 
Pty06-->Interest Groups08 0.139*** 0.086** 0.192*** 0.162*** 
Number of Observations  61,479 109,422 53,635 86,735 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Pty = party donor’s total contributions to the party committees  
in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total contributions by party donor to vulnerable incumbents  
in corresponding election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by party donor to experienced non-incumbents  
in corresponding election cycle; Interest groups= total contributions by party donors to all interest groups in 
corresponding election cycle. 
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Table 2: Predicting Party Donors' Contributions to House Candidates and 
Interest Groups 2010-2012 
  
FIRST-TIME 
DONORS 
HABITUAL 
DONORS 
Goodness of Fit  DEM GOP  DEM GOP  
SRMR 0.027 0.024 0.054 0.012 
Coefficient of Determination  0.873 0.815 0.787 0.312 
Direct Effects         
Pty10-->Experienced10  -0.008 -0.044** -0.004 0.087** 
Pty10-->Vulnerable10 -0.110***  -0.011** -0.003 0.006*** 
Pty12-->Experienced12   0.005  -0.009 0.020*** 0.010** 
Pty12->Vulnerable12  0.005  0.107** 0.013*** 0.088* 
Pty10-->Interest Groups10  1.141***  1.249*** 1.333*** 2.085*** 
Pty12-->Interest Groups12  0.007  0.054* -0.008 0.014 
Total Effects         
Pty10--> Experienced12 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.02*** 
Pty10-->Vulnerable12  0.006** 0.037*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 
Pty10-->Interest Groups12 0.016** 0.038*** 0.072** 0.322 
Number of Observations  92,291 66,304 118,041 191,372 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Pty = party donor’s total contributions to the party committees  
in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total contributions by party donor to vulnerable incumbents  
in corresponding election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by party donor to experienced non-incumbents  
in corresponding election cycle; Interest groups = total contributions by party donors to all interest groups in 
corresponding election cycle. 
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Table 3: Predicting Non-Party Donors’ 
Contributions to House Candidates 2006-2008 
Goodness of Fit   
SRMR 0.033 
Coefficient of Determination  0.013 
Direct Effects  
IG06-->Experienced06 0.013*** 
IG06-->Vulnerable06 0.011*** 
IG08-->Experienced08 0.001 
IG08-->Vulnerable08 -0.0003 
Total Effects  
IG06--> Experienced08 0.008* 
IG06-->Vulnerable08 -0.004 
IG06-->Interest Groups08 0.312* 
Number of Observations  967,288 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; IG = donor’s total contributions  
to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable = total 
contributions by donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding  
election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by donor to  
experienced non-incumbents in corresponding election cycle 
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Table 4: Predicting Non-Party Donors 
Contributions to House Candidates 2010-2012 
Goodness of Fit    
SRMR 0.047 
Coefficient of Determination  0.02 
Direct Effects  
IG10-->Experienced10 0.006* 
IG10-->Vulnerable10 0.001 
IG12-->Experienced12 -0.01 
IG12->Vulnerable12 -0.256*** 
Total Effects  
IG10--> Experienced12 0.001 
IG10-->Vulnerable12 -0.256 
IG10-->Interest Groups12 0.376 
Number of Observations  965,273 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; IG = donor’s total contributions  
to all interest groups in the corresponding election cycle; Vulnerable =  
total contributions by donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding  
election cycle; Experienced = total contributions by donor to  
experienced non-incumbents in corresponding election cycle. 
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Table 5: Number of Party Donors by Type Who Made Contributions to House Candidates in Targeted Races, All 
Congressional Races, and No Congressional Races  
  2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Targeted 
Race 
Any 
Race 
Targeted 
Race 
Any 
Race 
Targeted 
Race 
Any 
Race 
Targeted 
Race 
Any 
Race  
DEMOCRATS 
Habitual  11,214 25,660 9,557 27,201 16,786 35,240 22,238 40,327 
First-time 3,511 8,019 1,818 6,062 6,321 13,310 8,566 15,375 
# Party Donors That 
Did Not Support 
House Candidates 89,071 105,534 123,475 74,968 
REPUBLICAN  
Habitual  8,269 22,851 9,973 26,343 8,695 32,248 10,847 30,311 
First-time 1,966 5,930 5,228 15,213 1,835 6,596 477 1,550 
# Party Donors That 
Did Not Support 
House Candidates 168,595 476,482 118,056 38,376 
Note: Habitual donors gave in at least two election cycles.  
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Table 6: The Impact of Party Donors on House Campaign Fundraising  
DEMOCRATS  2006 2008 2010 2012 
Number of House Candidates Supported 1,036 1,104 1,210 1,233 
All House Candidates  $103,238 $125,187 $118,195 $137,090 
Vulnerable Incumbents $200,751 $270,200 $535,245 $274,559 
Experienced Challengers  $131,798 $143,990 $60,470 $208,633 
Experienced Open Seat Candidates  $209,467 $365,926 $169,786 $196,018 
REPUBLICANS  2006 2008 2010 2012 
Number of House Candidates Supported 1,002 1,123 1,497 1,308 
All House Candidates  $101,012 $98,498 $107,472 $141,740 
Vulnerable Incumbents $465,402 $351,769 $109,378 $416,516 
Experienced Challengers $39,249 $93,770 $197,407 $101,199 
Experienced Open Seat Candidates  $210,817 $144,611 $228,524 $179,744 
Note: Average total contributions collectively raised from party donors shown ($)  
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On-line Appendix 
 
 
 
Note: Pty = total contributions by first-time party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by first-time party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by first-time party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by first-time party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Figure 1: Democratic First-time Donors 2006 and 2008
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Note: Pty = total contributions by first-time party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by first-time party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by first-time party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by first-time party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Note: Pty = total contributions by habitual party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by habitual party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by habitual party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by habitual party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Note: Pty = total contributions by habitual party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by habitual party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by habitual party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by habitual party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pty06
2.9e+07
1478
Pty08
402
ε1 3.3e+07
IG06
61
ε2 1.6e+09
IG08
69
ε3 1.9e+08
Exper06
14
ε4 1.6e+05
Exper08
20
ε5 2.7e+05
Vulner06
-1.5
ε6 1.3e+06
Vulner08
16
ε7 7.0e+06
.81
.29 .16
.1
.014
.00014
.0044 .0092
5.9e-05
.42
27051
.075
6.2e-05
1.3e+05
.018 .015
8.6e-05
.056
Figure 4: Republican Habitual Donors 2006 and 2008
	 37	
 
 
Note: Pty = total contributions by first-time party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by first-time party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by first-time party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by first-time party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Note: Pty = total contributions by first-time party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by first-time party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by first-time party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by first-time party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Note: Pty = total contributions by habitual party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by habitual party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by habitual party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by habitual party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pty10
3.9e+07
1232
Pty12
38
ε1 6.2e+06
IG10
338
ε2 2.3e+07
IG12
-28
ε3 5.7e+06
Exper10
27 ε4 2.1e+05
Exper12
79
ε5 1.8e+07
Vulner10
39
ε6 6.0e+05
Vulner12
23
ε7 2.8e+05
.27
1.3 -.18 -.0084
.19
-.0039
.015
53366
-.011 .02
.025 -.0059
.24
-88722
-.0031
.036
-.0036 .013
.011 -.0077
.14
Figure 7: Democratic Habitual Donors 2010 and 2012
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Note: Pty = total contributions by habitual party donor to all party committees in corresponding election cycle; 
Exper= total contributions by habitual party donor to experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding 
election cycle; Vulner= total contributions by habitual party donor to vulnerable incumbents in corresponding 
election cycle; IG=total contributions by habitual party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle  
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Figure 8: Republican Habitual Donors 2010 and 2012 
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Note: IG=total contributions by non-party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle Exper= total 
contributions by non-party donor to all experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding election cycle; 
Vulner= total contributions by non-party donor to all vulnerable incumbents in corresponding election cycle 
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Figure 9: Non-Party Donors 2006 and 2008 
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Note: IG=total contributions by non-party donor to all interest groups in corresponding election cycle Exper= total 
contributions by non-party donor to all experienced non-incumbent candidates in corresponding election cycle; 
Vulner= total contributions by non-party donor to all vulnerable incumbents in corresponding election cycle 			
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